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The security of two-state quantum key distribution against individual attack is estimated when the
channel has losses and noises. We assume that Alice and Bob use two nonorthogonal single-photon
polarization states. To make our analysis simple, we propose a modified B92 protocol in which Alice
and Bob make use of inconclusive results and Bob performs a kind of symmetrization of received
states. Using this protocol, Alice and Bob can estimate Eve’s information gain as a function of a
few parameters which reflect the imperfections of devices or Eve’s disturbance. In some parameter
regions, Eve’s maximum information gain shows counter-intuitive behavior, namely, it decreases as
the amount of disturbances increases. For a small noise rate Eve can extract perfect information
in the case where the angle between Alice’s two states is small or large, while she cannot extract
perfect information for intermediate angles. We also estimate the secret key gain which is the net
growth of the secret key per one pulse. We show the region where the modified B92 protocol over
a realistic channel is secure against individual attack.
PACS numbers: PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd 03.67.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a way to share be-
tween the sender, Alice, and the receiver, Bob, a secret
key whose information is not known to the eavesdrop-
per, Eve. Since the first QKD protocol, called BB84
protocol, was introduced by Bennett and Brassard [1],
several schemes for QKD have been proposed, such as
Ekert protocol [2], which is based on the nonlocality of
quantum mechanics, B92 protocol [3], which uses two
nonorthogonal states, and so on [4]. In each protocol,
since Eve cannot eavesdrop without disturbing quantum
states, she will induce some errors or changes in the trans-
mission rate. In ideal situations where imperfections such
as transmission losses and dark counting of detectors do
not exist, one can prove that the QKD protocols are se-
cure even when Eve employs any kind of eavesdropping
strategies including so-called collective attack or coherent
attack, which is the most general attack where a single
probe is entangled to the whole transmitted pulses. In
practice, however, imperfections exist and if Eve gets rid
of imperfections by using her unlimited technology (for
example, she may replace the noisy channel to a noise-
less channel), Eve can disturb quantum states to a certain
degree and therefore she obtains some information about
the secret key. Estimation of the amount of information
extracted by Eve and construction of a secure secret key
under such situations are not a trivial problem.
There are several works which deal with the security
of realistic QKD. In [5, 6, 7, 8, 9], it is proven that under
some conditions the BB84 protocol is secure even when
Eve employs coherent attack. The security proof in [8]
reveals a tight connection to the entanglement purifica-
tion protocol [10] and quantum error correcting codes,
especially Calderbank-Shor-Steane codes [11]. This proof
can be also applied to BB84-type protocols such as the
6-state protocol [12] where the basis information is ex-
changed over a public channel. The security against the
individual attack, which is more restricted but more re-
alistic, was also discussed for the BB84 protocol [13] and
for the Ekert protocol [14].
On the other hand, we have not yet fully understood
the security of the B92 protocol. The discussions so
far concerned with the security against individual attack
[15, 16]. In each paper, the single-photon polarization is
used as a carrier of the quantum signals, and the trans-
mission loss is not included. In [15], Fuchs and Peres have
calculated the upper bound of Eve’s Shannon information
gain averaged over all transmitted bits. Slutsky and co-
authers have estimated the upper bound of Eve’s Renyi
information gain in a B92 protocol as a function of the er-
ror rate when Alice and Bob discard errors [16]. The B92
protocol, which uses only two states, is conceptually the
simplest of all the protocols. In addition, the protocol
includes a continuous parameter (the nonorthogonality
between the two states) that can be chosen by the users,
forming a striking contrast to the BB84-type protocols.
Further understanding of the security of the B92 protocol
is thus important not only for the practical applications
but also for deeper understanding of the nature of quan-
tum information.
In this paper, we estimate the security of the B92 pro-
tocol against individual attack over a realistic channel
including noises and transmission losses. We assume,
like in [15, 16], that Alice encodes the bit values in two
single-photon polarization states (the original B92 in [3]
uses two nonorthogonal coherent states). We consider a
modified protocol in which inconclusive measurement re-
sults are also used for the estimation of Eve’s information
gain, in addition to the bit error rate used in the previ-
2ous analyses. The problem is also regarded as one of the
basic problems of quantum eavesdropping, namely, the
maximum information leak to an adversary who are sim-
ulating the noisy quantum channel through which Alice
transmits Bob a bit encoded on two quantum states.
We briefly describe how Alice and Bob can obtain the
secret key whose information available to Eve is negli-
gibly small. First, Alice prepares nonorthogonal single-
photon polarization states | 0 〉 and | 1 〉, depending on the
bit values of the raw key, and sends them to Bob. After
propagating through the noisy channel or through eaves-
dropping by Eve, | 0 〉 and | 1 〉 generally become mixed
states, ρ0 and ρ1, respectively. Secondly, Bob performs
measurement whose outcomes are 0, 1 and “?”. The
outcome “?” means an inconclusive result where Bob
cannot determine which state Alice has sent. Thirdly,
Alice and Bob discard inconclusive bits and they recon-
cile the errors in conclusive bits by an error correction
protocol which is the technique of classical information
theory to obtain the reconciled key. Finally, in order to
eliminate Eve’s information about the reconciled key, Al-
ice and Bob shorten their keys via a privacy amplification
protocol [18], which is also the technique of the classical
information theory. How much they should shorten the
reconciled key depends on how much information about
the reconciled key Eve could have obtained. The last two
procedures are done over a public channel. It is assumed
that Eve can listen to the information exchanged over
the public channel, but she cannot alter it. By means
of these techniques, Alice and Bob can obtain the iden-
tical secret key, even under the imperfections and Eve’s
interference.
In the above framework, it is important for Alice and
Bob to estimate Eve’s information about the reconciled
key properly. To estimate this information, we propose
a slightly modified protocol. The difference between our
protocol and the original protocol is that when Bob ob-
tains an inconclusive result, Alice opens which state she
has sent. Using this extra data, Bob performs data pro-
cessing which is a kind of symmetrization of the states
received by Bob. This makes our analysis simpler with-
out underestimating Eve’s ability. We can estimate Eve’s
information by using the symmetrized density matrices.
Eve’s information gain is calculated as a function of a
few parameters which characterize the symmetrized den-
sity matrices. Since Bob’s symmetrized density matrices
can be fully characterized by the observed quantities and
classical communication, the problem we have solved is
equivalent to the problem of how much maximum in-
formation Eve can extract while she simulates the noisy
channel. The answer to this problem has turned out to
be more complex than expected; We found a counter-
intuitive phenomenon where the maximum information
gain is not monotone increasing as a function of the
amount of noises when the angle between Alice’s two
states is small. We also found that for a small noise rate,
Eve can extract perfect information in the case where
the angle of Alice’s two states is very small or very large,
while she cannot extract perfect information for the in-
termediate angle. We give an explanation that is useful
to understand these behavior intuitively.
We also performed an optimization of the angle be-
tween Alice’s two states that makes the rate of the final
key gain as high as possible. We show that the opti-
mized angle decreases as the amount of noises and the
transmission losses increase. Unfortunately, the assump-
tion of the polarization encoding makes the B92 protocol
particularly weak against channel losses, so that the key
gain is always smaller than in the BB84 protocol.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we de-
scribe our assumption on the apparatus used by Alice and
Bob, and the limitation on Eve’s strategy. Our slightly
modified B92 protocol is proposed in Sec. III. Then, in
Sec. IV, we consider Bob’s data processing for the sym-
metrization of the density matrices, and in Sec. V, we op-
timize Eve’s eavesdropping strategy and calculate Eve’s
maximum information gain as a function of the param-
eters that reflect imperfections or Eve’s disturbance. In
Sec. VI, we calculate the secret key gain as a function
of these parameters. Finally Sec. VII is devoted to the
summary and discussion.
II. ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, we describe the assumptions on the
abilities of the legitimate users (Alice and Bob) and the
eavesdropper (Eve). We put these conditions throughout
this paper.
First, we describe what Alice and Bob perform with
ideal apparatus. The B92 protocol is originally consid-
ered to use two nonorthogonal coherent states. In this
paper, however, we assume two nonorthogonal single-
photon polarization states for the simplicity of analysis.
We denote the Hilbert space for each pulse as H , which
contains arbitrary photon number states, and the sub-
space that contains only one photon asH1. The subspace
H1 is two-dimensional reflecting the polarization degree
of freedom, and the states in H1 are conveniently repre-
sented by the Bloch sphere. We define |σϕ 〉 and |σϕ 〉
for −π < ϕ < π as follows,
|σϕ 〉 ≡ cos ϕ
2
| z+ 〉+ sin ϕ
2
| z−〉,
|σϕ 〉 ≡ sin ϕ
2
| z+ 〉 − cos ϕ
2
| z−〉 for ϕ ≥ 0 ,
and |σϕ 〉 ≡ − sin ϕ
2
| z+ 〉+ cos ϕ
2
| z−〉 for ϕ < 0 ,(1)
where | z+ 〉 and | z−〉 are the eigenstates of σz (z com-
ponent of Pauli matrix) whose eigenvalues are +1 and
−1, respectively. ϕ is the angle between |σϕ〉 and | z+ 〉
on the x− z plane in the Bloch sphere.
We assume that Alice prepares the following states de-
pending on the bit value,
| 0〉 ≡ |σ−α′〉 and | 1〉 ≡ |σα′ 〉 (0 ≤ α′ ≤ π/2), (2)
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FIG. 1: Bob’s measurement basis in the Bloch sphere.
where the parameter α′ characterizes the nonorthogonal-
ity between the two states, such that
〈0|1〉 = cosα′ . (3)
When these states are sent to Bob through the noisy
quantum channel, | 0 〉 and | 1 〉 generally become mixed
states, ρ0 and ρ1, respectively. On these states, Bob
measures the polarization on the basis {|σ−α〉, |σ−α〉}
or {|σα〉, |σα〉}, which is selected randomly. The
whole measurement process is described by the follow-
ing POVM [20]
F0 ≡ 1
2
|σ−α〉〈σ−α|
F0 ≡
1
2
|σ−α〉〈σ−α|
F1 ≡ 1
2
|σα〉〈σα|
F1 ≡
1
2
|σα〉〈σα|
FV ≡ 1− F0 − F0 − F1 − F1 (4)
where “V” means the states which contain zero or more
than one photon, where allowances are made for the ef-
fect of transmission losses. Fi and Fi (i = 0, 1) are shown
in Fig. 1 schematically using Bloch sphere. Here we al-
low general cases where α is not necessarily equal to α′.
We call the events inconclusive where Bob’s outcome of
the measurement is 0 or 1, and the events where Bob’s
outcome is 0 or 1 conclusive.
In reality, the transmission line and Alice and Bob’s
apparatus is not perfect (see Fig. 2). We assume one
condition on the character of the imperfection, namely,
the imperfection is equivalently represented as a noise
source placed just after Alice’s ideal apparatus, and a
noise source just before Bob’s ideal apparatus. Under
this condition, Fig. 2 becomes Fig. 3. We need some care
for this assumption. For example, if the noisy photon
detectors PD1 and PD2 in Fig. 2 have different quantum
efficiencies, we cannot transform this model into Fig. 3
directly. However, if Bob interchanges noisy PD 1 and
noisy PD 2 at random, which effectively makes the ef-
ficiency of these detectors identical, we can transform
Fig. 2 into Fig. 3, and the assumption can be met.
 noisy PD1 
 noisy PD2 
 noisy PBS
Eve Bob
noisy source noisy PR
Alice
noisy PR
FIG. 2: An example of experimental setup. “noisy PR” is the
noisy polarization rotator, “noisy PBS” is a noisy polarization
beam splitter, and “noisy PD1” and “noisy PD2” are noisy
photon detectors. Our assumption is that this setup can be
transformed into Fig. 3.
 ideal PD 1
 ideal PD2 
 ideal PBS
Eve Bob
ideal source ideal PR
Alice
NS NS ideal PR
FIG. 3: The model of our setup. The “NS” represents the
noise source of Alice or Bob’s device. Since Alice and Bob
cannot separate noises due to imperfections and ones due to
Eve, they should assume, for security, that Eve can also con-
trol NS, which extends Eve’s region up to dotted line. Due
to this assumption, the legitimate users’ apparatuses look like
ideal. “Ideal PR” is an ideal polarization rotator which ac-
curately rotates the polarization of photons, “ideal PBS” is
an ideal polarization beam splitter, and “ideal PD 1 (2)” is
an ideal photon detector with unit quantum efficiency and no
dark counting.
The benefit of the above assumption is that we can
use a simpler model in which Alice and Bob’s appara-
tus is perfect, in the following sense. In Fig. 3, the re-
gion bounded by dash-dotted lines is under Eve’s control.
Suppose that this region is extended up to the dotted
lines. While this assumption may make the length of the
final key shorter than the optimum one, at least we can
avoid the risk of underestimating Eve’s ability. In this
model, every imperfection is attributed to the property
of the quantum channel, and the analysis is considerably
simplified. This assumption has been also used in the
previous works [14, 17].
We assume that Eve’s eavesdropping is restricted to
individual attack. The definition of individual attack is
that eavesdropping is independently done for each pulse
and there exists no correlation of events among pulses. In
the most general individual attack, Eve prepares her aux-
4iliary system (probe) E in an initial state |w〉E, interacts
it with one pulse sent by Alice via a unitary operation
U , and performs measurements on the probe E to obtain
the bit information. We do not impose any restriction on
Eve’s measurement on the probe. We do not treat more
general attack, such as collective attack or coherent at-
tack.
III. PROTOCOL
In this section, we propose a protocol slightly modified
from the original one, which makes it possible to identify
the density matrices of the states received by Bob more
tightly. The main idea is that Alice and Bob can iden-
tify the density matrices more precisely by monitoring
more parameters. In our protocol, Alice and Bob mon-
itor not only the error rate in conclusive bits, but also
the statistics of inconclusive bits. This additional infor-
mation makes it possible to identify the density matrices
after a symmetrization which is described in Sec. IV.
Our modified protocol consists of the following steps.
1. Alice determines a bit value j = 0 or j = 1 ran-
domly, and sends to Bob the single-photon polar-
ization state | j〉 defined by Eq. (2).
2. Bob performs the measurement described by
POVM {Fµ}(µ = 0, 1, 0¯, 1¯,V) defined by Eq. (4).
3. If the measurement result was µ = 1¯, Bob sets the
received bit value as j′ = 0, and if µ = 0¯, he sets
j′ = 1. In both cases, Bob tells Alice over the
public channel that the result was conclusive, and
Alice adopts j and Bob adopts j′ as a bit value of
their raw keys, respectively. If the measurement
result was µ = 0, 1, or V, Bob opens the result µ,
and Alice opens the bit value j in the cases µ = 0, 1.
4. Alice and Bob repeat steps 1–3 ntotal times and
obtain their raw keys.
5. Error reconciliation: To make an identical key (the
reconciled key) from their raw keys, Alice and Bob
perform an error correction protocol. The recon-
ciled key consists of “correct bits” which were found
to be correct and “flipped bits” which were found
to be incorrect and hence flipped in the error cor-
rection protocol. In order not to leak the additional
information about the final key to Eve, a previously
shared secret key is used to encrypt the communi-
cation over the public channel. A small length of
the secret key is also used to make sure that the
reconciled key is identical, using an authentication
protocol [21].
6. Estimation of Eve’s information: After the pub-
lic communication about the inconclusive events in
step 3 and the error reconciliation in step 5, Bob
knows Alice’s original bit values for the cases where
Bob’s measurement results were µ = 0, 1, 0¯, 1¯. He
can determine the number of events nj,µ (µ =
0, 1, 0¯, 1¯; j = 0, 1) where Alice’s choice was j and
Bob’s result was µ. Assuming that ntotal is large,
2nj,µ/ntotal gives a good estimate of the quantity
Tr(Fµρj). Bob estimates the maximum informa-
tion that can be leaked to Eve under the condition
Tr(Fµρj) = 2nj,µ/ntotal . (5)
The estimation of Eve’s information gain is sepa-
rately made for the correct bits and for the flipped
bits.
7. Privacy Amplification: To eliminate the informa-
tion leaked to Eve, Alice and Bob produce a secure
final key by shortening the correct bits and flipped
bits of reconciled key according to the information
gains estimated in step 6 via a privacy amplification
protocol.
The most important part in the quantum key distri-
bution through a noisy channel is the estimation of the
leaked information done in step 6. The detailed proce-
dures in the proposed protocol above were chosen so as
to make the estimation easier. First, we use not only the
error rate in conclusive bits but also the measurement
results of inconclusive bits to fix the density operator of
the state delivered to Bob more tightly. Secondly, the op-
timization of Eve’s measurement on her probe system is
simplified by estimating Eve’s information about correct
bits and flipped bits independently. For the correct bits,
the state of Eve’s probe when the bit value of the final key
is 0 is a pure state C0〈1 |U | 0 〉 |w 〉E ≡ |φ0〉E, and the
state when the bit value is 1 is C1〈0 |U | 1 〉 |w 〉E ≡ |φ1〉E,
where C0 and C1 are the constants for normalization.
In our estimation of Eve’s information gain on each cor-
rect bit, we use the information gain I defined through
the collision probability P (i|ν)2 averaged over possible
Eve’s outcomes ν. Here P (i|ν) is the posteriori proba-
bility that Alice’s bit value is i (the state of Eve’s probe
was |φi〉E) under the condition that Eve has obtained
outcome ν. The explicit definition of the information
gain I is
I ≡ 1−

− log2 ∑
i=0,1
∑
ν
P(ν)P(i|ν)2

 , (6)
where P (ν) is the probability that Eve obtains outcome
ν. This measure is useful since it directly tells us how
much we should shorten the key in the privacy amplifi-
cation [17, 18]. The quantity I is maximized by the Von
Neumann measurement on the basis symmetrically ar-
ranged around the vectors |φ0〉E and |φ1〉E [16, 19], and
thus we obtain the maximum information gain for each
correct bit IGc which can be written as
IGc = log2
(
2− |Q|2) , (7)
5where
Q ≡ E〈φ0 |φ1 〉E = E〈w|〈0|U
†|1〉〈0|U |1〉 |w〉E√
|E〈w|〈0|U †|1〉|2
√
|〈0|U |1〉 |w〉E|2
.
(8)
Note that the same measurement also maximizes the in-
formation gain measured with respect to Shannon en-
tropy [19], and its maximum value IGcS is given by
IGcS = 1− h
(
1−
√
1− |Q|2
2
)
, (9)
where h(x) is the entropy function defined as h(x) ≡
−x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1 − x).
The maximum information gain IGf for each flipped
bit can be obtained by merely changing the defini-
tion of Q with Q′ ≡ E〈φ′0 |φ′1 〉E, where |φ′0〉E ≡
C′0〈0 |U | 0 〉 |w 〉E ≡ and |φ′1〉E ≡ C′1〈1 |U | 1 〉 |w 〉E. The
problem of finding the maxima of IGc and IGf reduces to
finding the minimum of |Q| or |Q′|, which will be solved
in Sec. V.
In our analysis, we assume, for simplicity, an unrealis-
tic assumption that Eve can deal correct bits and flipped
bits independently, which may overestimate the amount
of the leaked information. If we try to deal these together,
we need to optimize Eve’s measurement in four dimen-
sional Hilbert space, and the optimization would be more
complicated. We leave the tight estimation of the leaked
information in such cases to future investigations.
We have to be careful about leaked information during
the error reconciliation protocol. The redundant infor-
mation used in step 5 contains the partial information of
the secret key. So, in order to prevent this leakage of in-
formation, redundancy bits are encrypted by previously
shared secret key. On the other hand, since we assume
Eve employs individual attack, in other words the events
for different pulses are independent, the public communi-
cation concerned with inconclusive results in step 4 does
not leak any information about the conclusive results,
and so we need not to encrypt this communication.
IV. SYMMETRIZATION OF EVE’S STRATEGY
In this section, we consider the symmetrization of Eve’s
strategy which simplifies our analysis, but never under-
estimates Eve’s ability. The discussion can be similarly
applied to the flipped bits.
The eavesdropping strategy of Eve, specified by the
unitary operator U , gives the information gain about the
correct bits of the final key that is determined through
the quantity Q(U) defined by Eq. (8). It also determines
the density operators ρj (j = 0, 1) of the states delivered
to Bob as follows,
ρj = TrE
[
U |j〉|w〉EE〈w|〈j|U †
]
. (10)
On the other hand, these density matrices must satisfy
Eq. (5). The problem to be solved is to find the minimum
value of |Q| under the constraint Eq. (5).
A standard way of symmetrization would be to replace
the transformation U to an operation with higher sym-
metry U˜ , such that Eqs. (5) and (10) still hold, and
|Q(U)| ≥ |Q(U˜)| holds. Then, Eve’s information gain
can be estimated by minimization of |Q| over possible U˜
without fear of underestimation.
Instead of using such a standard scheme, here we in-
voke a transformation U → U s with |Q(U)| ≥ |Q(U s)|,
but Eqs. (5) and (10) with U replaced by U s are not
necessarily satisfied. The transformation U → U s is ex-
plained in Appendix A. The states that would be received
by Bob when Eve performed U s are given by
ρsj = TrE
[
U s|j〉|w〉EE〈w|〈j|(U s)†
]
. (11)
Due to the symmetry of U s, these states are simply
parametrized by {θ, ǫ, T } as follows:
ρs0 = T
(
1− ǫ
2
) ∣∣σ−(α+θ)〉〈σ−(α+θ)∣∣
+ T
ǫ
2
|σ−(α+θ)〉〈σ−(α+θ)|+ (1− T )|vac〉〈vac| ,
(12)
and
ρs1 = T
(
1− ǫ
2
) ∣∣σ(α+θ)〉〈σ(α+θ)∣∣
+ T
ǫ
2
|σ(α+θ)〉〈σ(α+θ)|+ (1− T )|vac〉〈vac| ,(13)
where |vac〉 is the vacuum state. These density matrices
are shown in Fig. 4. An important point is that the states
ρsj are related to ρj as in Eqs. (A4)–(A8), and hence,
the parameters {θ, ǫ, T } should be related to the actually
observed quantities as follows:
(1− ǫ) cos θ = Tr[(F0 − F0¯)ρs0]
=
1
2
(Tr[(F0 − F0¯)ρ0] + Tr[(F1 − F1¯)ρ1])
= (n0,0 − n0,0¯ + n1,1 − n1,1¯)/ntotal (14)
(1− ǫ) cos(θ + 2α) = Tr[(F1 − F1¯)ρs0]
=
1
2
(Tr[(F1 − F1¯)ρ0] + Tr[(F0 − F0¯)ρ1])
= (n0,1 − n0,1¯ + n1,0 − n1,0¯)/ntotal (15)
and
T = 1− Tr[FV(ρ0 + ρ1)/2]
=
∑
j=0,1
∑
µ=0,1,0¯,1¯
nj,µ/ntotal. (16)
Eqs. (12)-(16) imply that the density operators ρs0 and ρ
s
1
can be completely specified by Bob through the observed
quantities.
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FIG. 4: The density operators on x-z plane in the Bloch
sphere that Bob uses to estimate Eve’s extracted information.
ρ˜s0 and ρ˜
s
1 do not have y components and they are symmetric
with respect to z axis.
The above argument is summarized as follows. Sup-
pose that Eve conducted a strategy U and Bob obtained
the values of {θ, ǫ, T } through the observed quatities and
relations (14)-(16). The states ρsj is determined by Eqs.
(12) and (13). Then, there exists an attack with unitary
operator U s satisfying Eq.(11) and |Q(U)| ≥ |Q(U s)|.
Hence, the minimum of |Q(U)| can be safely estimated
by the minimization of |Q(U s)| under the condition that
U s satisfies Eq.(11).
Let us further reduce the minimization problem in
a convenient form. Using Schmidt decomposition,
Eqs. (12) and (13) lead to the expressions of the total
pure states
U s| 0〉 |w〉E =
√
T
(
1− ǫ
2
)
|σ−(α+θ) 〉 | a1 〉E
+
√
T
ǫ
2
|σ−(α+θ)〉 | a2 〉E
+
√
1− T | vac〉 | av〉E , (17)
and
U s| 1〉 |w〉E =
√
T
(
1− ǫ
2
)
|σ(α+θ) 〉 | b1 〉E
+
√
T
ǫ
2
|σ(α+θ)〉 | b2 〉E
+
√
1− T | vac〉 | bv〉E , (18)
where | ai〉E and | bi〉E(i = 1, 2) are orthogonal to the
space spanned by | av〉E and | bv〉E, since Eve knows the
photon number in this strategy. | ai〉E and | bi〉E(i = 1, 2)
satisfy
E〈ai| aj〉E = δi,j , E〈bi| bj 〉E = δi,j , (19)
and hence connected by a unitary operator ξˆ, namely,
| bi〉E = ξˆ| ai〉E. (20)
By applying the discussion in Appendix A, the unitary
operator ξˆ is a real orthogonal matrix in the basis W,
since U s, |σϕ〉, |σϕ〉, |vac〉, and |w〉 are invariant under
ZW.
The condition for U s to be unitary can be written as
E〈w|〈0|(U s)†U s| 1 〉 |w〉E = 〈0|1〉 , (21)
which means
TTr
[
Bˆξˆ
]
+ (1− T ) cosφ = cosα′, (22)
where
cosφ = E〈av| bv〉E, (23)
Bˆ =
∑
i,j
Bij | ai 〉EE〈 aj |, (24)
B11 =
(
1− ǫ
2
)
cos (α+ θ) , (25)
B12 = B21 =
√(
1− ǫ
2
) ǫ
2
sin (α+ θ) , (26)
(27)
and
B22 = − ǫ
2
cos (α+ θ) . (28)
Note that for arbitrary φ and arbitrary real orthogonal
matrix ξˆ satisfying Eq. (22), there exists a corresponding
unitary operator U s.
Using ξˆ and Eq. (8), Q(U s) can be written as a function
of ξˆ as
Q(ξˆ) = Tr
[
Aˆξˆ
]
(29)
where
Aˆ =
∑
i,j
Aij | ai 〉EE〈 aj |, (30)
A11 =
(2− ǫ) sin2 (α+ θ2)
[1− (1− ǫ) cos(2α+ θ)] , (31)
A12 = A21 = −
√
ǫ (2− ǫ) sin (2α+ θ)
2 [1− (1− ǫ) cos(2α+ θ)] , (32)
and
A22 =
ǫ cos2
(
α+ θ2
)
[1− (1− ǫ) cos(2α+ θ)] . (33)
Therefore, the problem of finding the minimum of |Q(U)|
reduces to the problem of finding the minimum of |Q(ξˆ)|
under the constraint∣∣∣TTr [Bˆξˆ]− cosα′∣∣∣ ≤ 1− T. (34)
7V. OPTIMIZATION OF EVE’S APPARATUS
AND HER INFORMATION GAIN
In this section, we determine the minimum of |Q(ξˆ)|
under the constraint Eq. (34). It is convenient to intro-
duce a functionQmin(B) which is defined as the minimum
of |Q(ξˆ)| under the condition
B(ξˆ) ≡ Tr
[
Bˆξˆ
]
= B (35)
for −Bmax ≤ B ≤ Bmax, where Bmax is the maximum of
Tr[Bˆξˆ] over all ξˆ for a given Bˆ. Since B11B22 −B212 ≤ 0,
Bmax is given by
B2max = (B11 −B22)2 + 4B212 . (36)
Note that the relations B(−ˆξ) = −B(ξˆ) and |Q(−ξˆ)| =
|Q(ξˆ)| imply that Qmin(B) = Qmin(−B). Several
properties of Qmin(B) are derived from the fact that
Qmin(cosα
′) is equal to the minimum of |Q(ξˆ)| under
the constraint Eq. (34) when T = 1. Since Eve can
freely determine the bit value j when cosα′ = 0, we have
Qmin(0) = 0. Moreover, since Eve can always convert
the initial states |j〉 to |j′〉 such that 〈1′|0′〉 ≥ cosα′,
Qmin(B) is a never-decreasing continuous function for
B ≥ 0. Therefore, Qmin(B) = 0 in a range |B| ≤ B0,
and Qmin(B) > 0 for B0 < |B| ≤ Bmax. The minimum
of |Q(ξˆ)| under the constraint Eq. (34) is given by
min |Q| = 0 when cosα
′ − (1− T )
T
≤ B0 (37)
and
min |Q| = Qmin
(
cosα′ − (1− T )
T
)
when
cosα′ − (1 − T )
T
> B0 . (38)
As we discuss the detail in Appendix B, in order to min-
imize |Q|, operator ξˆ must satisfy
[(νAˆ − λBˆ)2, ξˆ] = 0. (39)
where ν and λ are real parameters which satisfy [(ν, λ) 6=
(0, 0)].
The form of operator ξˆ satisfying this condition de-
pends on the rank of νAˆ − λBˆ. For the moment, we
assume that ǫ 6= 0. Since the rank of Aˆ is 1 and that of
Bˆ is 2, the rank of νAˆ− λBˆ is 1 or 2.
First, we consider the case where the rank of νAˆ−λBˆ
is 2. Let H0 be the subspace spanned by |a1〉E and
|a2〉E, which is the support of νAˆ − λBˆ, and H⊥0 be
the complementary space of H0. Let PˆH0 and PˆH⊥
0
be
the projection operators to the corresponding subspaces.
PˆH0 [(νAˆ−λBˆ)2, ξˆ]Pˆ⊥H0 = 0 implies that ξˆ|a1〉E ∈ H0 and
ξˆ|a2〉E ∈ H0. Hence the matrix form of ξˆ in H0 with
respect to the basis {|a1〉E, |a2〉E} should be written as
ξˆ =
(
cos η sin η
sin η − cosη
)
, (40)
which we call Type 1, or
ξˆ =
(
cos η − sin η
sin η cos η
)
, (41)
which we call Type 2. With the help of Eq.(29), Q(ξˆ)
and B(ξˆ) for Type 1 are given by functions of parameter
η as
Q(1)(η) = (A11 −A22) cos η + 2A12 sin η (42)
and from Eq.(35)
B(1)(η) = (B11 −B22) cos η + 2B12 sin η, (43)
respectively. Similarly, for Type 2, we have
Q(2)(η) = (A11 +A22) cos η = cos η (44)
and
B(2)(η) = (B11 +B22) cos η
= (1− ǫ) cos(α+ θ) cos η. (45)
|Q(1)| and |Q(2)| are plotted in Fig. 5 by solid line and
dot-dashed line respectively. Note that the choice of ξˆ
ξˆ| a1 〉E = cos η| a1 〉E + sin η| a3 〉E
ξˆ| a2 〉E = cos η| a2 〉E − sin η| a4 〉E (46)
where | a3 〉E and | a4 〉E are the states orthogonal to H0
and E〈a3 | a4 〉E = 0, yields the same dependence of Q
and B on η as Type 2. When | cos η| 6= 1, this ξˆ does
not satisfy Eq. (39), which means that |Q(2)(ηˆ)| cannot
be the minimum of |Q(ξˆ)|. When | cos η| = 1, |Q(2)(ηˆ)| is
unity from Eq.(29). Therefore, we can neglect |Q(2)| in
determining Qmin(B).
Next, we consider the case when the rank of νAˆ− λBˆ
is 1. Solving det(νAˆ − λBˆ) = 0 in H0, we find that this
case happens when λ = 0 [since detAˆ = 0 from Eqs. (31)-
(33)], or
λ
ν
=
A11B22 +A22B11 − 2A12B12
B11B22 −B212
≡ κ. (47)
The support of νAˆ − λBˆ is one-dimensional and let us
write the corresponding pure state as |a〉E ∈ H0. Let
|a⊥〉E ∈ H0 be the state orthogonal to |a〉E. Using the
same way as the derivation of Eqs. (40) and (41), Eq. (39)
implies that the matrix form of ξˆ in H0 with respect to
the basis {|a〉E, |a⊥〉E} should generally be written as
ξˆ = ±
(
1 0
0 cos η
)
. (48)
When λ = 0, |Q(ξˆ)| is always unity (from Eq.(29)), and
is not relevant for the present problem of finding the min-
imum of |Q(ξˆ)|. The case λ = κν is relevant, and we call
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FIG. 5: |Q| vs B when α = 10◦, ǫ = 0.05, θ = 15◦, and
T = 0.8. The solid line represents |Q| obtained by Type 1,
the dot-dashed line represents Type 2, and the dotted line
represents Type 3. In this figure, |Qmin| = 0 for 0 ≤ B ≤ B0
and |Qmin| = |Q
(1−)
min | for B0 ≤ B ≤ Bmax.
it Type 3. With the help of Eq.(29), Q(ξˆ) and B(ξˆ) for
Type 3 are given by functions of parameter η as
Q(3,±)(η) = ±[E〈a|Aˆ|a〉E + cos ηE〈 a⊥|Aˆ|a⊥〉E]
= ±[Tr(AˆPˆa)(1− cos η) + cos η] (49)
and from Eq.(35)
B(3,±)(η) = ±[E〈a|Bˆ|a〉E + cos ηE〈 a⊥|Bˆ|a⊥〉E]
= ±[Tr(BˆPˆa)(1− cos η) + cos ηTr(Bˆ)](50)
respectively, where
Pˆa ≡ |a〉EE〈a| = Aˆ− κBˆ
Tr(Aˆ− κBˆ) . (51)
|Q(3,±)| is plotted in Fig. 5 by dotted line. In the figure,
only |Q(3,−)| is plotted since |Q(3,+)| does not exist.
Finally, we consider the case where ǫ = 0. In this case,
Qmin(B) can be directly found as
Q(B) =
B
cos(α+ θ)
, (52)
and B0 = 0.
Now, since we have listed up all candidates for Eve’s
optimum operation, we can obtain Eve’s maximum infor-
mation gain by picking up the optimum one numerically.
We show some examples of Eve’s information gain as a
function of α′, α, T , θ, and ǫ in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7. In these
figures, we plot Eve’s maximum information gain as a
function of ǫ. Since the parameter ǫ corresponds to the
noise or the error rate, it might be expected that Eve’s
information gain increases when ǫ gets larger. In Fig. 7,
however, Eve’s information gain starts to decrease from
the unity when the noise parameter ǫ exceeds a value
around 0.13. In Fig. 8, the shaded region represents the
region where Eve’s information gain is unity when (a)
α′ = α = 10◦, and θ = 0◦, and (b) α′ = α = 45◦
and θ = 0◦. We can see again in Fig. 8 (b) the counter-
intuitive behavior that the Eve’s information gain is lower
in the region with larger ǫ.
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FIG. 6: Eve’s maximum information gain IGc vs ǫ when α′ =
α = 40◦, θ = 0◦, and T = 0.8.
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FIG. 7: Eve’s maximum information gain IGc vs ǫ when
α′ = α = 10◦, θ = 0◦, and T = 0.3. The dashed line is
the information bound based on Eq. (61).
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FIG. 8: Eve’s information gain is unity in the gray region
when (a) α′ = α = 40◦, and θ = 0, and (b) α′ = α = 10◦ and
θ = 0.
9In order to explain the counter-intuitive behavior in
Fig. 7, let us consider the mutual information among the
classical variables in Alice, Bob and Eve’s sites. Let A,
B, and E be the random variables describing Alice’s bit
value (0 or 1), Bob’s measurement result (0¯, 1¯, or incon-
clusive), and Eve’s classical data obtained from her at-
tack, respectively. Let us consider the conditional mutual
information I(E;A,B|c) ≡ H(A,B|c) − H(A,B|E, c),
which is the mutual information between Eve and the
joint system of Alice and Bob for conclusive bits. Here
c represents the condition that B = 0¯ or 1¯, meaning
that Bob’s measurement result is conclusive. The func-
tion H(A,B|c) represents the entropy of the joint sys-
tem on condition that Bob obtains a conclusive result,
and H(A,B|E, c) stands for the conditional entropy of
the joint system averaged over Eve’s variable E, namely,
H(A,B|E, c) ≡ ∑y Prob(E = y)H(A,B|E = y, c). Us-
ing the basic properties of the entropy function, we can
easily see that the following relation holds:
I(E;A,B|c) + I(A;B|c) = I(A;B,E|c) + I(B; E|c). (53)
The information I(E;A,B|c) is, hence, bounded as fol-
lows:
I(E;A,B|c) ≤ I(A;B,E|c) + I(B; E|c). (54)
The term I(A;B,E|c) in the right-hand side means how
well the joint system of Bob and Eve can distinguish
Alice’s states on condition that Bob obtains a conclusive
result, and this term can be bounded from the fact that
Alice’s states are nonorthogonal, as follows. With the
help of the inequality
I(A;B,E) ≥ PconcI(A;B,E|c)+ (1−Pconc)I(A;B,E|inc) ,
(55)
where “inc” means B = inconclusive and Pconc is the
probability that Bob obtains the conclusive results. For
θ = 0 and α′ = α, Pconc is given by
Pconc =
T
4
[2− (1 − ǫ)(cos 2α+ 1)] , (56)
we can bound I(A;B,E|c) as
I(A;B,E|c) ≤ I(A;B,E)
Pconc
≤
1− h
(
1−√1−cos2 α
2
)
Pconc
. (57)
The second inequality in Eq. (57) comes from the op-
timum measurement on two nonorthognal pure states,
which was mentioned in Sec. III.
The second term I(B; E|c) in the right-hand side of
Eq.(54) means how well Eve can control Bob’s measure-
ment outcomes, B = 0¯ and B = 1¯. Since Bob’s POVM
elements F0 and F1 are nonorthogonal, Eve cannot con-
trol Bob’s outcome as she please, and I(B; E|c) generally
decreases as α decreases. As we discuss the detail in
Appendix C, I(B; E|c) is bounded by
I(B; E|c) ≤ 1
− h

1
2
− sinα
4(Pconc/T )
√
1−
(
2(Pconc/T )− 1
cosα
)2 .(58)
Combining Eqs. (54), (57), and (58), the mutual infor-
mation I(E;A,B|c) is bounded by
I(E;A,B|c) ≤
1− h
(
1−√1−cos2 α
2
)
Pconc
+ 1− h

1
2
− sinα
4(Pconc/T )
√
1−
(
2(Pconc/T )− 1
cosα
)2
≡ ν (59)
After the transmission of n pulses from Alice to Bob,
we expect nconc ≡ nPconc conclusive events on average,
and Eve’s information about Alice and Bob’s bits for
these events is bounded by nPconcν. This quantity ap-
proaches zero when α goes to zero. On the other hand,
Alice and Bob obtain ncor ≡ nPconc(1 − e) correct bits,
where e is the bit error rate given by
e =
ǫ
2− (1− ǫ) (cos 2α+ 1) , (60)
for θ = 0 and α′ = α. The number of correct bits ncor
does not necessarily approach zero when α goes to zero.
The information gain per one correct bit, IGcS , cannot
exceed nconcν/ncor, namely,
IGcS ≤
ν
1− e ≡ I
upper
S . (61)
Since Shannon information gain IGcS [Eq. (9)] and the
information gain IGc [Eq. (7)] are connected by only one
parameter Q, we can bound IGc through IupperS . In Fig. 7,
we plot this information bound by the dashed line. The
dashed line decreases as ǫ gets larger.
To summarize, the counter-intuitive behavior can be
explained as follows. When α is small, Alice’s bit value
cannot be guessed well from the outside since she encodes
it into nonorthogonal states. Bob’s measurement results
are also hard to guess since they come from nonorthog-
onal measurements. As a result, the mutual information
between Alice and Bob, I(A;B|c), and Eve’s information
I(E;A,B|c), are both upper-bounded by the quantity ν,
which approaches zero when α goes to zero. On the other
hand, when ǫ is large, the number of the conclusive bits
is not small even when α is close to zero. This means
that Alice’s bits and Bob’s bits for the conclusive bits
are almost uncorrelated when α is close to zero. Then,
Alice and Bob construct the correct bits by picking up the
bits whose values accidentally coincide, through the en-
crypted communication over the classical channel. In this
case, the correct bits are essentially generated in this en-
crypted transmission, and Eve’s information gain about
them is very low. It is, however, not practical to perform
quantum key distribution in this region, since Alice and
Bob must use many bits of the initially shared secret key
to determine the correct bits.
Figure 9 shows in gray the region where Eve’s infor-
mation gain is unity in the parameter region {α, ǫ} for
T = 1, θ = 0, α′ = α. The upper-left white region (small
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FIG. 9: Eve’s information gain is unity in the gray region
{α, ǫ} for T = 1 and θ = 0.
α and large ǫ) corresponds to the counter-intuitive be-
havior we have just discussed. The figure shows another
interesting behavior for small ǫ; Eve’s information gain
is unity only when α is small or large, and is not unity
for intermediate values of α. For T < 1, the region for
the full information gain for Eve has a similar shape to
Fig. 9, but is wider because the transmission loss gives
advantage to Eve. In order to understand this behavior
at T = 1, we consider the following specific individual
attack that gives Eve the perfect information about the
correct bits.
If Eve is sure that the state |1〉(= |σα〉) released by
Alice always evolves to |0〉(= |σ−α〉) and then reaches
Bob, Eve can be sure that the value of the conclusive bit
surviving the error discarding procedure is 0. The sim-
plest way to perform this attack is to rotate the system
counter-clockwise by angle 2α in the Bloch sphere (see
Fig. 1). To keep the symmetry, for half of the cases Eve
rotates the system by angle −2α. For the latter cases
she can be sure that the value of the correct bit is 1. In
this attack, the averaged state ρs1 received by Bob when
Alice has emitted |1〉 is given by ρs1 = (|σ−α〉〈σ−α| +
|σ2α〉〈σ2α|)/2 = cos2 α|σα〉〈σα|+sin2 α|σα〉〈σα|. This at-
tack is thus successful when ǫ = 2 sin2 α, which coincides
with the upper boundary in Fig. 9.
The above “rotating” strategy can be improved by per-
forming a weak measurement before the rotation, so that
it can be used for smaller values of ǫ. The weak measure-
ment with outcomes {+,−} is described by the POVM
{Aˆ+, Aˆ−}, where
Aˆ+ = (1− q)|x+〉〈x + |+ q|x−〉〈x− | (62)
and
Aˆ− = q|x+〉〈x + |+ (1− q)|x−〉〈x − | . (63)
The parameter q (0 ≤ q ≤ 1/2) represents the weakness
of the measurement. If Alice has emitted |j〉 (j = 0, 1),
the outcome “+” and “−” occur with probability pj+ ≡
〈j| Aˆ+|j〉 and Pj− ≡ 〈j| Aˆ−|j〉, respectively. When this
weak (projection) measurement produced outcome “+”,
the angle β (in the Bloch sphere) between the postmea-
surement states
√
Aˆ+|0〉 and
√
Aˆ+|1〉 is given by
cos2(β/2) = |〈0|Aˆ+|1〉|2/(p0+p1+). (64)
The outcome “−” gives the same angle by the symmetry.
The angle β is monotone increasing from 0 to 2α as a
function of q ∈ [0, 1/2].
After this measurement, Eve rotates the system de-
pending on the outcome. For “+”, she rotates it so that√
Aˆ+|0〉 becomes |1〉. The state
√
Aˆ+|1〉moves to |σα+β〉
in this rotation. When the outcome is “−”, she rotates
it so that
√
Aˆ+|1〉 becomes |0〉. In this attack, the av-
eraged state ρs1 received by Bob when Alice has emitted
|1〉 is given by ρs1 = p1−|σ−α〉〈σ−α| + p1+|σα+β〉〈σα+β |.
This state can be written in the form (1− ǫ/2)|σα〉〈σα|+
(ǫ/2)|σα〉〈σα| when
sinβ/ sin 2α = p1−/p1+ (65)
holds. In such a case, the value of ǫ is given by
ǫ = 1− sin(2α+ β)
sin 2α+ sinβ
. (66)
The equation (65) has two solutions in q ∈ [0, 1/2], q =
q0(α) and q = 1/2. The case of q = 1/2 corresponds
to the simple rotating strategy described before. The
strategy corresponding to the other solution q = q0(α)
turns out to give the lower boundary in Fig. 9. The entire
gray region in Fig. 9 is then covered by simply mixing the
two strategies corresponding to q = q0(α) and q = 1/2.
The behavior for small ǫ shown in Fig. 9 will now be
understood as follows. When α is small, the simple ro-
tating strategy with the small rotation angle 2α causes
only a small disturbance, and it can be used to obtain
small ǫ. When α is large and the two states can be well
distinguished, the improvement of the strategy by the
measurement is quite effective to reduce ǫ. For interme-
diate values of α, p0+/p1+ cannot be close to zero. Since
p0+ = p1−, the angle β cannot be close to zero either,
due to the constraint (65). Consequently, as is implied
by Eq. (66), even the improved strategy cannot reduce ǫ
close to zero.
VI. SECRET KEY GAIN
In this section, we show the calculation of secret key
gain and the optimum angle of Alice’s states to obtain
optimum secret key gain. For simplicity, we assume that
α = α′ and θ = 0. The calculation for more general cases
is straghtforward.
We define the secret key gain G as the net growth of
the secret key per one pulse. Alice and Bob can increase
the length of the secure secret key in the region where G
is positive.
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In the calculation of key gain, we assume the error cor-
rection protocol whose number of redundancy bits used
to detect the errors of the raw key are equal to the Shan-
non limit, i.e., nh(e), where n is the length of the raw key,
e is the bit error rate of the raw key given by Eq. (60), and
h(e) is entropy function. We further assume that the pri-
vacy amplification [18] is applied to the correct bits and
to the flipped bits independently. Since Eve may not be
allowed to adopt the strategy that is simultaneously opti-
mum both for correct bits and flipped bits, this protocol
may be overkill but never underestimates Eve’s ability.
For the privacy amplification of the correct bits, we use
Eve’s information estimated via the method described in
the previous sections. From these bits Alice and Bob
obtain Gnewc bits per pulse of new secret key, which is
written as
Gnewc ≡ Pconc(1− e)(1− IGc)− (sc/ntotal) (67)
where Pconc is given by Eq. (56), ntotal is the number of
pulses emitted by Alice, and sc is the security parame-
ter for correct bits. Eve’s information about the secret
key obtained from the correct bits is less than 2−sc/ ln 2
(bits).
For flipped bits, Alice and Bob obtain Gnewf bits per
pulse of new secret key, which is written as
Gnewf ≡ Pconce(1− IGf)− (sf/ntotal) . (68)
Eve has information less than 2−sf / ln 2 (bits) about the
secret key from the flipped bits. The information gain
for flipped bits IGf can directly be obtained by replacing
θ with −2α− θ in the formula in Sec. IV.
Noting that the redundancy bits used in the error cor-
rection protocol are encrypted by consuming Pconch(e)
bits per pulse of the initially shared secret key, we obtain
the expression of the secret key gain G as follows,
G ≡ Gnewc +Gnewf − Pconch(e)
= Pconc
[
(1− e)(1 − IGc) + e(1− IGf)− h(e)]
− (sc + sf )/ntotal . (69)
In the limit of long key, i.e., ntotal →∞, G is reduced to
G = Pconc
[
(1− e) (1− IGc) + e(1− IGf)− h(e)] . (70)
In B92 protocol, if α′(= α) is changed, the secret key
gain will be changed. So, Alice and Bob should optimize
this angle to obtain higher secret key gain. In Fig. 10,
we optimize α′ (= α) for fixed values of T and ǫ [24] to
obtain high secret key gain, and plot the key gain and the
optimized angle as a function of ǫ. The points “A” and
“B” represent the cases when ǫ = 0 and when the key
gain vanishes, respectively. In the figure, as ǫ increases,
the optimum angle tends to be smaller, and the region
where optimum angle α′ = 0 implies that our protocol
does not work. In the figure, there is only a negligible
contribution of flipped bits to the key gain.
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FIG. 10: (a) The optimized secret key gain per pulse and
(b) optimal angle α◦ as a function of ǫ. T = 0.8, α′ = α
and θ = 0◦. “A” represents the angle when ǫ = 0 and “B”
represents the angle when the key gain vanishes.
To investigate the T dependence on the optimum angle
which are represented as “A” and “B”, we plot these
angles as a function of T in Fig. 11. For “A”, the key
gain has a simple expression
G =
T
4
(1−cos 2α′)
[
1− log2
(
2−
(
cosα′ − 1 + T
T cosα′
)2)]
.
(71)
In Fig. 11, it is seen that as T gets larger, the optimum
angle tends to get larger. In Fig. 12, we plot ǫ of “B”
as a function of T . The region below the curve means
the parameter region of {T, ǫ} where a secure key can be
produced in our protocol.
Finally, to compare the security of B92 with that of
BB84 assuming an ideal single-photon source, we con-
sider the dependence of G as a function of distance be-
tween Alice and Bob, while imperfection factors such as
dark counting of detectors and losses of optical fibers are
fixed. For the purpose of this comparison, we consider
the case where Bob uses photon counters which can dis-
criminate no photon, single-photon, and higher number
of photons. Let l, Lc, Lr, ν, and η be the length of
transmission line (km), the channel loss (dB/km), the
receiver loss (dB), the mean dark count per pulse (which
is given by ν = τresRdark where Rdark is the dark count-
ing rate and τres is the resolution time of the detector
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FIG. 12: The maximum value of ǫ up to which the secret key
gain is positive as a function of T .
and electronic circuitry), and the detection efficiency, re-
spectively. In this case, T is given by [25]
T = e−ν η 10−(lLc+Lr)/10 + e−ν ν(1− 10−(lLc+Lr)/10) ,
(72)
where we assume that the dark counts are Poissonian
events. From this equation and
ρ˜si =
e−ν η 10−(lLc+Lr)/10
T
|i〉〈i|
+
e−ν ν(1− 10−(lLc+Lr)/10)
T
1
2
= (1− ǫ)|i〉〈i|+ ǫ
2
1 , (73)
ǫ can be written as
ǫ =
e−ν ν(1 − 10−(lLc+Lr)/10)
T
. (74)
In Fig. 13, we plot log10G as a function of distance l(km).
In the figure, we put α(α′) = 11(degree) which is almost
optimum, and experimental data is taken from KTH [26].
For the secret key gain of BB84 protocol in the figures,
we used the formula for the single-photon case in [13],
G =
T
2
[1− log2(1 + 4e− 4e2) + e log2 e
+ (1− e) log2(1 − e)] , (75)
where e = ν/(2T ), assuming that the errors stem from
the dark counting. In Fig. 13, it is seen that B92 pro-
tocol is far less efficient, which is mainly because a low
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FIG. 13: Comparison of B92 (solid line) with BB84 (dotted
line) in the case where Lc = 0.2(dB), Lr = 1(dB), ν = 2 ×
10−4(per pulse), and η = 18 (%). The dotted line represents
BB84 and solid line represents B92 protocol.
transmission rate T directly gives an advantage to Eve
in the B92 scheme using photon polarization.
VII. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Throughout this paper, we have estimated Eve’s infor-
mation gain IGc. But as Bennett et al. pointed out in
Sec. VI of [18], if eavesdropping is independently done for
each pulse, privacy amplification using information gain
based on the expected collision probability is overkill. In
such case, it follows that it may be sufficient to estimate
Eve’s information gain by Shannon entropy. In the case
where Eve employs the symmetric von Neumann mea-
surement, the proof in [18] assures that Shannon entropy
is enough for the estimation. Maximizing Eve’s informa-
tion gain with respect to Shannon entropy is equivalent to
the problem of minimizing |Q|2, which is the same prob-
lem as the maximization of Eve’s information gain IGc.
So, our method described in the previous sections can
be directly applied to this problem. We plot an example
of the secret key gain for some cases when we estimate
Eve’s maximum information gain by Shannon entropy in
Fig. 14. We see that the key gain is higher than the case
where Eve’s information is estimated by IGc.
Another candidate which may make the key gain
higher is error reconciliation protocols. There may be
the case where error discarding protocols [23] are more
efficient than the error correction protocol, because the
redundancy bits consumed in a discarding protocol may
be less, for Alice and Bob do not need to keep the dis-
carded bits secret in the error discarding protocol. In
the calculation of all figures in Sec. VI, we have checked
that there is no contribution of the flipped bits to the
secret key, which implies that the use of an error dis-
carding protocol may be more efficient than that of an
error correction protocol.
Since the density matrices which Alice emits are fixed
as well as those which are received by Bob, the problem
of our estimation of quantum key distribution over a re-
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FIG. 14: The secret key gain vs ǫ in the case of T = 0.3,
α′ = α = 12◦ and θ = 0◦. Eve’s information is estimated
by Shannon entropy (solid line) and IGc (dotted line). The
estimation by Shannon entropy is more efficient.
alistic channel is reduced to the problem that how much
information Eve can extract on the condition that both
initial density matrices ρi (i = 0, 1) and final density
matrices ρ′i are fixed. In the realistic situation, however,
since the number of pulses ntotal which are emitted by
Alice is finite, we cannot uniquely identify the final den-
sity matrices. In such a situation, by considering the
standard deviation of Bob’s data, we can pick up the
candidates of the final density matrices, and we can es-
timate Eve’s maximum information gain by comparing
information gain for each candidates.
To summarize this paper, we derived a formula that es-
timates Eve’s maximum information when Alice and Bob
perform B92 protocol using two nonorthogonal single-
photon polarization states. We have assumed that Alice
can emit a single photon and Eve employs individual at-
tack. The problem is equivalent to ask how much infor-
mation can be extracted while simulating a noisy channel
through which Alice communicates with Bob by send-
ing the two nonorthogonal states. The dependence of
the maximum information on the noise parameter shows
nontrivial behavior. It decreases as the noise increases in
some parameter regions. For a small noise rate, Eve can
extract perfect information in the case where the angle
of Alice’s two states is very small or very large, while
she cannot extract perfect information for intermediate
angles. Using the formula, we plot the secret key gain
as a function of various parameters reflecting interven-
tion by Eve. We also investigated the optimum angle
between the two states to obtain large secret key gain,
and showed the region of the parameters where this key
gain is positive. A comparison of our protocol with BB84
protocol shows that B92 protocol with single photon po-
larization is less efficient than BB84 protocol, which is
mainly because a low transmission rate T directly gives
an advantage to Eve in the B92 scheme using photon po-
larization. This drawback may be compensated in the
original B92 protocol using two nonorthogonal coherent
light, or in the 4+2 protocol [4] that uses the switching of
the basis as in BB84 while retaining the nonorthgonality
as a freely adjustable parameter. We leave the security
problems of such protocols to future studies.
We have assumed throughout this paper that eaves-
dropping is independent for each pulse. Even within the
independent quantum operation, Eve can obtain a cor-
relation among her eavesdropping outcomes by choosing
her strategy depending on the outcomes which have been
already obtained. The estimation against such attack
is important for the realistic purpose, but we also leave
this problem for future studies, along with the security
against collective attack or coherent attack.
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APPENDIX A: SYMMETRIZATION OF EVE’S
STRATEGY
In this appendix, we construct a symmetrized strategy
U s, which possesses higher symmetry and the same power
as the actual strategy U , namely, |Q(U s)| = |Q(U)|. The
problem of minimizing |Q| over possible U is then sim-
plified to the minimization over possible U s. Similar dis-
cussion is seen in Appendix A of [16]. In addition to the
symmetry, this reduction makes the analysis simpler be-
cause the states delivered to Bob by the strategy U s are
completely specified by the observed quantities.
First, consider a strategy U ′ in which Eve conducts an
additional (nondestructive) measurement of the photon
number just after the original strategy of U satisfying
Eqs. (5) and (10). After this measurement, if the out-
come of this measurement is one photon, she sends the
projected state to Bob, but if the outcome is no photon
or more than one photon, she always sends the vacuum
state | vac 〉. The states ρ′j(j = 0, 1) delivered to Bob in
this strategy are given by
ρ′j = P1ρjP1 + (1− Tj) | vac 〉〈vac |, (A1)
where P1 is the projection onto the subspace H1 of one
photon and
Tj ≡ 1− Tr[FVρj ] , (A2)
which is the probability that Bob detects a single-photon.
Since Tr(Fµρ
′
j) = Tr(Fµρj) (µ = 0, 1, 0¯, 1¯; j = 0, 1), the
strategy U ′ satisfies the condition Eq. (5), and the ad-
ditional measurement only gives Eve extra information,
|Q(U ′)| ≤ |Q(U)| holds. Hence, in finding the minimum
of |Q(U)| under the condition Eq. (5), we are allowed to
assume the additional assumption that ρj is equal to ρ
′
j
and is written as
ρj = Tj ρ˜j + (1− Tj) | vac 〉〈vac |, (A3)
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where ρ˜j ≡ P1ρjP1/Tj is a normalized density operator
in H1.
Next, take a basis of the signal space H that includes
| z+〉, | z−〉, and | vac 〉 as elements, and take a basis of
Eve’s probe space that includes |w 〉. The product states
of the two bases form a basis of the combined system,
and let us denote it as W. Let ZW be the transforma-
tion which replaces all the vector components and the
elements of matrices in the basis W with their complex
conjugates. Since the initial states | j 〉 |w〉E(j = 0, 1) and
Bob’s measurement {Fµ} are invariant under the trans-
formation ZW, and the probabilities of events in quan-
tum mechanics are given by moduli squared of vector
inner products, the strategy given by the unitary opera-
tor ZWUZ
−1
W gives the same amount of the information
gain to Eve as the strategy U .
Similarly, let σz ≡ |z+〉〈z + | − |z−〉〈z − | be the π
rotation around the z axis in the Bloch sphere, and R be
the extension of σz to the entire space (R ≡ (σz ⊕FV)⊗
1E, where subscript E means Eve’s probe space). Since
the changes in the initial states | j 〉 |w 〉E(j = 0, 1) and
Bob’s measurement {Fµ} under the transformation R is
just the interchange of the bit values 0 and 1, the strategy
given by the unitary operator RUR−1 gives the same
amount of the information gain to Eve as the strategy U .
Since the four strategies U , ZWUZ
−1
W , RUR
−1, and
RZWUZ
−1
W R
−1 give the same amount of information
gain, the strategy in which Eve randomly chooses one of
the four unitary operations also gives the same amount
of information gain. In other words, if we write the uni-
tary operator corresponding to this randomized strategy
as U s, then |Q(U s)| = |Q(U)| holds. The states ρs0 and
ρs1 delivered to Bob in this strategy are given by
ρs0 =
1
4
(ρ0 + ZWρ0Z
−1
W +Rρ1R
−1
+ ZWRρ1R
−1Z−1W )
= T ρ˜s0 + (1− T )|vac〉〈vac| (A4)
and
ρs1 =
1
4
(ρ1 + ZWρ1Z
−1
W +Rρ0R
−1
+ ZWRρ0R
−1Z−1W )
= T ρ˜s1 + (1− T )|vac〉〈vac|, (A5)
where
ρ˜s0 =
1
4T
[T0(ρ˜0 + ZWρ˜0Z
−1
W ) + T1(Rρ˜1R
−1
+ ZWRρ˜1R
−1Z−1W )], (A6)
ρ˜s1 = σz ρ˜
s
0σz , (A7)
and
T ≡ T0 + T1
2
= 1− Tr[FV(ρ0 + ρ1)/2] . (A8)
From these expressions, we have
Tr[σy ρ˜j
s] = 0, (A9)
where σy ≡ i|z−〉〈z+ | − i|z+〉〈z− |. Eqs.(A4) and (A9)
implies that ρ˜sj are written in the Bloch sphere as in
Fig. 4. Taking the parameters θ and ǫ as in Fig. 4 (the
sign of θ is positive in the clockwise), ρsj can be written
in a diagonalized form as in Eqs. (12) and (13).
APPENDIX B: OPTIMIZATION OF EVE’S
APPARATUS
In this appendix, we derive Eq. (39). In order to deter-
mine the function Qmin(B), we use Lagrange’s method of
undetermined multipliers. B0 is the maximum of B(ξˆ)
under the condition that Q(ξˆ) = 0. Hence, if B(ξˆ) = B0
and Q(ξˆ) = 0, such ξˆ satisfies
δ(B(ξˆ)− νQ(ξˆ)) = 0 (B1)
for any variation of ξˆ. Qmin(B) for B0 < B ≤ Bmax
is determined by minimizing Q2(ξˆ) under the condition
that B(ξˆ) = B. Suppose that Q2(ξˆ) takes its minimum
at ξˆ under the condition that B(ξˆ) is fixed. Then, at
least one of the following conditions holds, namely,
δB(ξˆ) = 0 (B2)
for any variation of ξˆ, or, there exists real λ′ such that
δ(Q2(ξˆ)− λ′B(ξˆ)) = 0 (B3)
for any variation of ξˆ. Since Q(ξˆ) 6= 0 in the considered
region, the condition (B3) is equivalent to
δ(Q(ξˆ)− λB(ξˆ)) = 0 , (B4)
where λ ≡ λ′/2Q. The three conditions (B1), (B2), and
(B4) can be cast into a common form, namely, there exist
real ν and λ [(ν, λ) 6= (0, 0)] such that
δ(νQ(ξˆ)− λB(ξˆ)) = 0 (B5)
for any variation of ξˆ. In determining B0 and Qmin(B),
it is sufficient to consider only the operator ξˆ satisfying
the above condition.
Since ξˆ is a real orthogonal matrix in the basis W, any
variation of ξˆ can be written as ξˆ → ξˆ (1+ Nˆδ), where Nˆ
is an arbitrary real antisymmetric matrix in W and δ is
an infinitesimal real number. Then, the condition (B5)
means
Tr
[
(νAˆ− λBˆ) ξˆ Nˆ
]
= 0 (B6)
for any Nˆ whose matrix form in W is real and anti-
symmetric. This condition is satisfied if and only if
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(νAˆ − λBˆ) ξˆ is a real symmetric matrix in W. Since
(νAˆ − λBˆ) is a real symmetric matrix and ξˆ is a real
orthogonal matrix in W, we have
(νAˆ− λBˆ) ξˆ = ξˆ−1(νAˆ− λBˆ) (B7)
and hence
[(νAˆ − λBˆ)2, ξˆ] = 0. (B8)
APPENDIX C: THE UPPER BOUND OF I(B; E|c)
In this appendix, we derive an upper bound of I(B; E|c)
in Eq. (58), assuming that Eve freely prepares quantum
states and sends them to Bob. We only require that Eve
should not change the values T and Pconc. Hence, Eve’s
strategy is generally described as she sends a single pho-
ton with its polarization in the state ργ with probability
P (γ)T , and she sends the vacuum with probability 1−T .
The probability P (γ) should satisfy∑
γ
P (γ) = 1 , (C1)
and ργ and P (γ) should satisfy∑
γ
P (γ)P (c|γ) = Pconc/T . (C2)
Here P (c|γ) is the probability of obtaining conclusive re-
sults for the state ργ , which is given by
P (c|γ) = Tr [(F0 + F1)ργ]
= Tr
[(
cos2
α
2
|z+〉〈z + |+ sin2 α
2
|z−〉〈z − |
)
ργ
]
=
1
2
[1− cosαTr(σzργ)] . (C3)
The mutual information I(B; E|c) can be written as
I(B; E|c) = H(B|c)−H(B|E, c)
≤ 1−
(
T
Pconc
∑
γ
P (γ)P (c|γ)H(B|γ, c)
)
.(C4)
The entropy H(B|γ, c) is given by
H(B|γ, c) = h
(
1
2
−
∣∣P (0|γ, c)− P (1|γ, c)∣∣
2
)
= h
(
1
2
−
∣∣Tr[(F0 − F1)ργ ]∣∣
2P (c|γ)
)
. (C5)
Using
F0 − F1 =
sinα
2
σx (C6)
and the relation Tr(σzργ)
2 +Tr(σxργ)
2 ≤ 1, we obtain
H(B|γ, c) ≥ h

1
2
− sinα
4P (c|γ)
√
1−
(
1− 2P (c|γ)
cosα
)2
≡ g (P (c|γ)) , (C7)
Since the function x → xg(x) is convex (we have con-
firmed this numerically), I(B; E|c) in Eq. (C4) is maxi-
mum when P (c|γ) = Pconc/T for all γ, and we obtain the
result
I(B; E|c) ≤ 1− g (Pconc/T ) , (C8)
which is Eq. (58).
[1] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceeding of the
IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems,
and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India (IEEE, New
York, 1984), pp.175-179 (1984).
[2] A. K. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett, 67, 661 (1991).
[3] C. H. Bennett, Phys. Rev. Lett, 68, 3121 (1992).
[4] B. Huttner, N. Imoto, N. Gisin, and T. Mor,
Phys. Rev. A51, 1863 (1995), L. Goldenberg and L. Vaid-
man, Phys. Rev. Lett, 75, 1239 (1995), M. Koashi and
N. Imoto, Phys. Rev. Lett, 79, 2383 (1997).
[5] H.-K. Lo and H. F. Chau, quant-ph/9803006.
[6] D. Mayers, quant-ph/9802025.
[7] E. Biham, M. Boyer, P. O. Boykin, T. Mor, and V. Roy-
chowdhury, quant-ph/9912053.
[8] P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett, 85, 441
(2000).
[9] H. Inamori, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and D. Mayers, quant-
ph/0107017.
[10] C. H. Bennett, D. P. DiVincenzo, J. A. Smolin, and
W. K. Wootters, Phys. Rev. A 54, 3824 (1996).
[11] A. R. Calderbank and P. W. Shor, Phys. Rev. A 54, 1098
(1996), A. M. Steane, Proc. R. Soc. London A 452, 2551
(1996),
[12] H. -K. Lo, quant-ph/0102138,
[13] N. Lu¨tkenhaus, Phys. Rev. A 61, 052304 (2000).
[14] E. Waks, A. Zeevi, and Y. Yamamoto, quant-
ph/0012078.
[15] C. A. Fuchs and A. Peres, Phys. Rev. A 53, 2038 (1996).
[16] B. A. Slutsky, R. Rao, P.-C. Sun, and Y. Fainman,
Phys. Rev. A, 57, 2383 (1998).
[17] N. Lu¨tkenhaus, Phys. Rev. A 59, 3301 (2000).
[18] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, C. Cre´peau, and U. M. Mau-
rer, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 41, 1915 (1995).
[19] L. B. Levitin, in Quantum Communication and Measure-
ment, edited by V. P. Belavkin, O. Hirota, and R. Hudson
(Plenum, New York, 1995), pp.439-448.
[20] J. Preskill,
http://www.theory.caltech.edu/people/preskill/ph229/ .
16
[21] M. N. Wegman and J. L. Carter, J. Comp. Syst. Sci. 22,
265 (1981).
[22] Although the Appendix B of [16] claims that the expected
Renyi entropy is maximized by the symmetric von Neu-
mann measurement, they have also proved in their proof
an inequality, which reads 2〈Pc〉 − 1 ≤ 1 − |Q|
2 in our
notation, showing that the expected collision probability
〈Pc〉 is also maximized by the symmetric von Neumann
measurement.
[23] C. H. Bennett, F. Bessette, G. Brassard, L. Salvail and
J. Smolin, J. Cryptology, 5, 3 (1992).
[24] In general, there exist correlations among α′, α, θ, and ǫ.
But since we can calculate Eve’s information gain for any
α′, α, T , θ, and ǫ, even if such a correlation exists, Alice
and Bob can maximize the secret key gain by taking this
correlation into consideration.
[25] S. M. Barnett, L. S. Phillips, and D. T. Pegg,
Opt. Comm. 158, 45 (1998).
[26] M. Bourennane, F. Gibson, A. Karlsson, A. Hening, P.
Jonsson, T. Tsegaye, D. Ljunggren, and E. Sundberg,
Opt. Express 4, 383 (1999).
